Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

From Melos to Venezuela: How Power Politics Returned to the World

About two and a half thousand years ago, the Greek world was consumed by a brutal war between two superpowers.

Athens dominated the seas.
Sparta ruled the land.

Caught between them were dozens of smaller city-states. Some chose sides. Some tried to stay neutral. One of them was a small island called Melos.

Symbolic illustration linking ancient Greek history with modern global power politics

Melos declared neutrality. It did not attack anyone. It did not support either side. It believed that staying out of conflict would keep it safe.

Athens disagreed.

When Athenian forces arrived at the gates of Melos, the island was given a choice: surrender and submit, or be destroyed. When the Melians protested that neutrality should protect them, Athens replied with a sentence that still echoes across history:

The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they must.

Melos was wiped out.

That ancient episode is not just history. It is a warning — one the modern world is beginning to relearn.

Why Venezuela Changed the Tone of Global Power

The recent American operation in Venezuela, including the seizure of its sitting president and effective control over its oil infrastructure, did more than alter the country’s political future.

It changed the language of power.

For decades, global interventions were wrapped in procedural language: democracy, international norms, humanitarian concern. Even when controversial, there was an effort to maintain the appearance of a rules-based order.

This time, the pretense was thin.

The action was justified through an openly revived interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, the 200-year-old policy that declares the Western Hemisphere as America’s exclusive sphere of influence. In diplomatic circles, this aggressive reinterpretation has quietly acquired a new nickname: the “Donroe Doctrine.”

The message was unambiguous.
The Americas are America’s domain.
External influence will not be tolerated.
Rules apply only when power allows them to.

This was not subtle diplomacy. It was raw geopolitics.

From Rules to Spheres of Influence

After the Second World War, much of the world attempted to move away from “might is right” politics. Institutions like the United Nations were created to offer smaller countries protection under shared norms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of a multipolar or even non-polar world gained traction.

But that arrangement always depended on restraint by the strongest power.

This week made something clear: if a dominant state decides to abandon restraint, the system cannot stop it.

The Western Hemisphere has been declared a closed courtyard again. Strategic, political, and economic interference will be resisted — not negotiated.

That shift matters far beyond Latin America.

Why This Quietly Benefits China

At first glance, a more assertive America might seem like bad news for China. In reality, the opposite may be true.

When the most powerful country openly abandons the language of international law and returns to unilateral enforcement, it weakens the very norms it once used to constrain rivals. Power politics become acceptable again — not just for one country, but for all.

China has long viewed East Asia, the South China Sea, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia as areas of vital interest. It has avoided declaring this openly, preferring patience and gradual expansion.

Now it does not need to explain itself.

If the Western Hemisphere belongs to Washington, Beijing can argue that the Eastern Hemisphere is its natural domain. An undeclared “Chunroe Doctrine” becomes easier to justify — not through speeches, but through precedent.

India’s Uneasy Position

For countries like India, this is where anxiety begins.

India is too large to be ignored and too exposed to rely on neutrality. It sits next to a rising power that increasingly thinks in terms of spheres, not borders. At the same time, it operates in a world where international law no longer offers reliable protection.

This is not a return to the Cold War. It is something older and less predictable.

A world where:

Power determines outcomes
Institutions offer limited restraint
Smaller and mid-sized states must fend for themselves

India already possesses deterrence. But deterrence alone does not guarantee security. Even nuclear-armed states face sustained pressure when power balances shift.

The Lesson History Keeps Repeating

The destruction of Melos was not caused by malice. It was caused by logic — the logic of unchecked power.

The same logic drove wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and now Venezuela. Different ideologies. Same mechanics.

The uncomfortable truth is that international politics has no enforceable constitution. When rules collapse, they are replaced not by chaos, but by hierarchy.

Big powers move first.
Smaller powers react.

The world may still speak the language of cooperation, but the grammar of power has returned.

And as history shows, neutrality, legality, and moral clarity do not protect states unless they are backed by strength.

Melos learned that too late.

The rest of the world is being reminded.

India's Battery Dependency: From Supply Chain Crisis to Energy Sovereignty

The silence of a stalled production line at four in the morning carries a weight that no economic report can truly capture. For many stakeholders in the Indian electric vehicle sector, this quietude has become a frequent, unwelcome companion. It is the sound of a dream deferred by geopolitical friction. While the media remains fixated on diplomatic sparring, the tangible reality involves idle machinery and frustrated laborers who find themselves at the mercy of export licenses issued thousands of miles away. India's battery dependency is no longer a theoretical risk; it is a structural bottleneck that demands immediate, domestic resolution.

The Fragile Foundation of Indian Electrification

The statistical reality of our current energy landscape is sobering. In the fiscal year of 2022, imports from China and Hong Kong accounted for more than 70% of the lithium-ion cells utilized within the subcontinent. This relationship is not merely a commercial preference but a profound structural reliance. When Beijing implemented more stringent licensing requirements for battery-related technologies last year, the impact was immediate and devastating. Our supply chain is currently a glass tower built upon a tectonic fault line. Is it wise to anchor a nation’s green revolution to the shifting policies of a single foreign entity?

Consider the plight of a startup in Chennai that was developing electric buses for municipal transit. The chief engineer recently shared that their primary cell supplier abruptly ceased all communication. Shipments were indefinitely delayed, costs inflated by 40%, and a critical contract nearly collapsed. This anecdote illustrates that global trade is remarkably fragile; it breaks not with a bang, but with a silent inbox.

Navigating the Narrative of Necessity

In the immediate aftermath of these supply disruptions, the public discourse was characterized by indignation. Television commentators spoke of "blackmail," and political figures promised swift retaliation. However, once the initial outcry subsided, the industrial sector began the arduous process of recalibration. The government responded by introducing a ₹9,000 crore Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme. This initiative seeks to foster the domestic manufacture of Advanced Chemistry Cells, effectively incentivizing giants like Reliance and Tata to bridge the gap.

To prevent the total stagnation of the market, the administration also relaxed local sourcing mandates. These regulations previously required 50% domestic content, a target that proved impossible to meet without a functional local cell industry. Furthermore, academic institutions have pivoted their research toward "Indian-spec" chemistry. We require batteries that can withstand the intense heat of the Thar Desert and the ubiquitous dust of our rural highways. Reliance on foreign blueprints often ignores these local environmental stressors. By seeking partnerships in Japan and Europe, India is diversifying its portfolio to ensure that no single country can halt our progress.

A Passionate Pursuit of Autonomy

The true essence of this struggle lies with individuals like Akshay, a Bengaluru-based entrepreneur who launched a battery firm as a direct response to these vulnerabilities. He views every Chinese export restriction as a catalyst for local ingenuity. We must recognize that dependency is a choice that we continue to make until the cost of remaining stagnant exceeds the pain of innovation. This transition will not occur overnight. It is a grueling marathon of chemical engineering and capital investment.

India will continue to import cells for the foreseeable future, yet the tide is visibly turning. This crisis has served as a necessary, albeit painful, wake-up call. If the shipments had remained steady, would we have felt the urgency to build our own foundations? Perhaps this period of scarcity is the very crucible required to forge a resilient, independent energy sector. We find ourselves in a constant tug-of-war between the convenience of the present and the security of the future. Eventually, the knock at dawn will not be a signal of shortage, but a testament to our own industrial awakening.

China Is Quietly Building a Payment System the Dollar Cannot Block

How Beijing is reducing its exposure to U.S. financial power without triggering a confrontation

There is a mistake many people make when they think about global power. They imagine tanks, missiles, or dramatic sanctions announcements. In reality, power often moves through quieter channels. Payment systems are one of them.

China understands this better than most.

While Washington focuses on tariffs, export controls, and headline sanctions, Beijing has been working on something far less visible. It is building financial plumbing that does not rely on the dollar, does not depend on SWIFT, and does not require Western permission to function.

This is not a revolution.
It is an exit strategy.

Why Payments Matter More Than Trade Wars

Sanctions work only when access points are limited. For decades, the United States controlled the most important access point of all: global payments.

Dollar settlement, correspondent banking, and SWIFT messaging gave Washington leverage that no military base ever could. Freezing accounts, blocking transfers, and isolating banks became tools of statecraft.

That leverage has been used aggressively.

Russia felt it first.
Iran lived with it longest.
Now China is preparing for it.

Beijing does not need to overthrow the dollar. It only needs to reduce its own vulnerability to it.

The Infrastructure Beijing Has Been Quietly Expanding

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, known as CIPS, was once dismissed as symbolic. It no longer is.

CIPS now connects hundreds of financial institutions across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Europe. According to public disclosures, its transaction volume has grown steadily year after year, particularly in trade settlement linked to energy, commodities, and infrastructure projects.

At the same time, China has signed dozens of bilateral currency swap agreements, allowing trade to clear directly in yuan or local currencies. Oil settled in yuan. Goods paid for without touching the dollar. Balances netted quietly at the end.

Nothing flashy.
Nothing confrontational.
Just fewer dollars involved each year.

This Is About Risk Management, Not Ideology

This is not China attempting to replace the dollar tomorrow. That framing misses the point.

The goal is insulation.

When sanctions become a political reflex, dependence becomes a liability. Germany learned this lesson through energy. China is applying it to finance. Systems that rely on goodwill tend to fail when goodwill disappears.

From Beijing’s perspective, the danger is not American hostility.
It is exposure.

The Dollar Still Dominates. That Is Not the Argument.

Yes, the dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency. Yes, most global trade still clears through it. None of that is disputed.

But dominance does not need to collapse to weaken. It only needs credible alternatives for large players. Once governments and companies know there is a fallback, leverage changes.

Sanctions become less frightening.
Pressure becomes less absolute.
Power becomes more negotiated.

This shift does not happen overnight. It happens quietly, transaction by transaction.

What Happens When Others Follow

The implications extend far beyond China.

As more countries adopt alternative payment routes, global finance becomes more fragmented and regional. Enforcement becomes harder. Compliance becomes selective. Trust, once centralised, spreads thin.

Countries facing sanctions today become early adopters. Countries fearing sanctions tomorrow quietly prepare. Over time, parallel systems harden into permanent features.

The irony is hard to miss. The tools designed to enforce order may be accelerating financial fragmentation.

A System Changing Without Announcements

China is not rushing. It does not need to.

Every year that passes with functioning alternatives reduces exposure. Every country pushed out of the dollar system becomes a future participant in parallel networks. Over time, those networks stop being temporary solutions and start becoming infrastructure.

When the next major geopolitical crisis arrives, the question will not be whether the dollar collapses. It will be how many countries no longer fear being cut off from it.

That is the real shift taking place.

And it is happening quietly.

Suggested visual (optional, one only)

Chart comparing share of global trade settled in USD vs local currencies over time
Or a simple flow diagram: SWIFT-based settlement vs CIPS-based settlement

A final thought for readers

If financial power is built on access, then every effort to restrict access encourages alternatives. The world may not be abandoning the dollar. But it is learning how to live without complete dependence on it.

That lesson will shape the next decade.

Who Rules the World When No One Is Wise? The Ethical Vacuum Behind the U.S.–China Rivalry

It began with that awkward handshake — Trump smiling too wide, Xi standing still. I watched it on my laptop one evening while the ceiling fan in Karachi hummed and the city lights flickered after another power cut.

In Munich, my daughter Fareha texted that they were keeping the heating low again. Baby Salar was asleep in his cot wearing a wool cap, though it was only October. She joked, “Baba, we live like monks with a mortgage.”

The handshake was supposed to calm markets. But what it really showed was a planet run by men who mistake showmanship for wisdom.

Maybe Fareha is right. Maybe we are governed by algorithms, not adults.

When the Courts End at the Border

Inside countries we still pretend there are limits — laws, courts, the idea of justice. But between nations, no such thing exists. There is no referee, no father to say “enough.”

Trade wars, sanctions, embargoes — they are modern words for the oldest game of domination. A few months ago, I overheard a trader in Bolton Market muttering over shipping rates as if reciting a prayer. His profit depended on how two distant men smiled in Seoul.

That is what global order means now: one leader’s tantrum, another’s patience, and a shopkeeper in Karachi forced to double his prices overnight.

The Moral Decay of Superpowers

Both Washington and Beijing talk about values. Both really mean leverage.

The United States has turned friendship into an investment — expendable when returns fall. Kissinger once said it was dangerous to be America’s enemy but fatal to be its friend. China, on the other hand, wraps power in the language of national humiliation and revenge. Two empires, two myths, one absence of conscience.

Trump’s tariffs and Xi’s stillness were not opposites; they were reflections in the same mirror. Power without empathy.

My son-in-law in Munich recently learned his firm would cut hours again because components from Shenzhen were delayed. One email from a supplier in Guangdong meant one less grocery trip that month. The empires never notice such arithmetic.

Chimpanzees With AI

A reader wrote to me, “We are still on chimpanzee level.” I think he’s right. We have built machines that can imitate wisdom but not practice it.

China speaks of the “century of rejuvenation.” America chants about “freedom.” Both confuse destiny with dominance. And the rest of us, the middle nations, translate their ambitions into inflation and anxiety.

When Fareha told me they now measure baby formula by the scoop, it struck me how grand politics becomes intimate pain. That is globalization in 2025 — a sleepless mother counting grams, a father watching the news half a world away.

The Century of Nobody’s Father

There was once a time when people believed in some moral North — the UN, human rights, a code larger than markets. Now it feels like those ideas have been sold for short-term gain. Institutions talk, missiles fly, currencies tremble.

When no one is wise, the market becomes God. Countries behave like corporations; citizens become data points. Artificial intelligence will only amplify the noise.

We are clever, not kind. Fast, not wise.

And yet, hope lingers in small places. In Salar’s laugh when Fareha video-calls from Munich. In Karachi’s evening breeze after the first rain. Maybe his generation will rebuild what ours has squandered — a sense of restraint, a touch of humility, a moral language larger than GDP.

Until then, we live in the century of nobody’s father.

China’s Trade Power Play: How a Legal Rewrite Could Warp Global Supply Chains

When Beijing updates a law, it’s rarely just paperwork. For the first time since 2004, China is revising its foreign trade law—adding new powers to impose bans, tighten export controls, and fortify its supply-chain defenses. That dry phrase—“legal revision”—masks something much bigger: a pivot that could change how the global economy runs.

A System Built in 2004, Broken in 2025

Back in 2004, China was still integrating into the World Trade Organization. Its foreign trade law was designed to reassure partners: open markets, predictable rules, stability. Two decades later, the world is very different. Tariffs are climbing to Depression-era levels, sanctions fly back and forth, and trust in the “free trade” system is collapsing.

This new law reflects that reality. It gives Beijing tools to retaliate quickly against countries that block Chinese exports—or to restrict critical goods like rare earths, solar panels, or electric-vehicle batteries.

Why Now?

Two reasons stand out:

The U.S. Tariff Surge – Washington has raised effective tariffs to their highest point since 1933. Trump’s White House openly treats tariffs as weapons.
Supply Chain Fragility – The pandemic, the Ukraine war, and sanctions on Russia showed how fragile just-in-time trade can be. China watched as semiconductors and advanced machinery became bargaining chips.

In short: Beijing doesn’t want to be caught off guard again.

What Could Change for the World

This isn’t just about legal language. If China actually uses these powers:

Tech Wars Escalate – Export controls could choke off rare earths or advanced materials. Imagine EV makers in Germany or battery factories in South Korea suddenly scrambling.
Energy Prices Swing – If Beijing curbs exports of solar components or wind turbines, Europe’s energy transition slows—and fossil fuels stay dominant longer.
Tit-for-Tat Spiral – Washington slaps tariffs, Beijing bans critical minerals, Brussels responds with carbon taxes. That “rules-based trade order” becomes more like a bar fight.

The Global Ripple Effect

The stakes go far beyond Beijing vs. Washington. Countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—many deeply tied to Chinese supply chains—may find themselves forced to pick sides.

Think about Brazil exporting soybeans or Indonesia supplying nickel. What happens if those deals are rerouted through political filters? For smaller economies, one Chinese export control could ripple into food prices, jobs, and inflation.

Historical Echo

The last time tariffs and trade restrictions rose this fast was the 1930s, under America’s Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. That spiral deepened the Great Depression and fueled geopolitical rivalries. China’s legal move doesn’t guarantee a repeat—but history warns us that weaponizing trade often ends badly.

Why This Matters

China isn’t just tweaking bureaucracy. It’s rewriting the rulebook of global commerce at a moment when trust is already scarce. The law signals a willingness to fight tariff with ban, sanction with blockade.

The real question: Will this push the world toward a fragmented system of trade blocs—U.S. vs. China vs. EU—or shock leaders into negotiating a new framework before things snap?

China’s lawmakers are sending a message: the era of quiet integration is over. From here, trade is power. And Beijing is preparing to wield it.

Iran’s Shopping Spree: Chinese Missiles on the Menu

So, picture this: Iran’s just been through a brutal 12-day clash with Israel in June 2025. Israeli jets pounded Tehran’s missile factories, nuclear sites, and military brass, leaving Iran’s defenses in tatters. Fast-forward a few weeks, and Iran’s not licking its wounds—it’s hitting the arms market. According to Middle East Eye, Tehran’s trading its black gold (oil, that is) for shiny new Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries. We’re talking advanced systems to plug the holes Israel blew open. This isn’t a one-off deal either. Posts on X claim Iran’s also eyeing Chinese J-10C fighter jets and HQ-9 air defenses, though those reports are murkier.

Why’s this a big deal? Iran’s missile arsenal—think ballistic beasts like the Fattah-1 hypersonic and Kheibar Shekan—was already a regional headache. Israel’s multilayered defenses (Iron Dome, Arrow, David’s Sling) stopped most of Iran’s 400+ missile barrage in June, but some got through, hitting Tel Aviv and Beersheba hard. Now, with China’s tech in the mix, Iran’s rebuilding faster and meaner. My take? This is Tehran saying, “We’re not done yet.” It’s a bold move, but it’s also a gamble—escalating when the region’s already a powder keg.

Oil for Arms: China’s Sneaky Play

Here’s where it gets juicy. Nearly 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports are flowing to China, per Reuters. Beijing’s been buying Iranian oil on the sly for years, dodging U.S. sanctions through “dark fleet” tankers and transshipment hubs like Malaysia. In return, China’s slipping Tehran the military hardware it needs. It’s a classic barter: oil for missiles, no questions asked. Middle East Eye reports this deal deepened post-ceasefire, as Iran scrambles to rebuild and China sees a chance to flex its influence.

This isn’t just about Iran’s defense. China’s playing chess while the U.S. and Israel are stuck in checkers mode. By arming Tehran, Beijing’s securing cheap oil and poking a stick at Washington’s sanctions regime. Plus, it’s a middle finger to the U.S.-Israel axis without firing a shot. My gut says China’s betting on a long game—keeping Iran as a counterweight to Western dominance in the Middle East. But here’s the rub: if Israel or the U.S. catches wind of these shipments, we could see strikes on those supply lines. And that’s where things get messy.

Oh, quick tangent—remember the 1980s when Iran got Chinese Silkworm missiles via North Korea and used them to mess with U.S. tankers? Yeah, this feels like that, but on steroids. History’s got a way of rhyming, doesn’t it?

The Ceasefire Wobble: Can It Hold?

Let’s talk about that ceasefire, brokered by Trump in June 2025, per AP News. It was supposed to cool things down after Israel’s surprise attack on Iran’s nuclear sites and Iran’s retaliatory missile volleys. Both sides took a beating—610 dead in Iran, 28 in Israel, per Reuters. Trump called it a “historic victory,” but it’s looking more like a timeout. Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, said Tehran would honor the truce if Israel does. Spoiler: trust is in short supply.

Now, with Chinese missiles rolling in, the White House and Arab allies like Qatar are sweating. If Israel smells a renewed threat, it might hit Iran preemptively—again. The Washington Post notes Israel’s already low on interceptors after June’s barrage, so another round could strain its defenses. And what about the U.S.? Sanctions on Chinese firms aiding Iran’s missile program were slapped on in May 2025, per the State Department, but they haven’t slowed Beijing down. My opinion? The U.S. is stuck—escalating risks a wider war, but doing nothing lets China and Iran tighten their grip.

Here’s the scary bit: if Iran’s new missiles tip the balance, we could see a rematch. Israel’s not shy about “mowing the lawn” (their term for preemptive strikes). But a miscalculation—say, a strike on a Chinese shipment—could drag Beijing deeper into the fray. Nobody wants that, right?

So, What’s Next?

This Iran-China missile deal is like tossing a match into a room full of gasoline. It’s not just about Tehran’s arsenal; it’s about a shifting global order where China’s calling more shots. The ceasefire’s holding for now, but it’s fragile as hell. If Israel attacks again, or if Iran’s new toys embolden it, we’re back to square one—only with higher stakes.

What do you think—can this truce survive Iran’s missile restock, or are we headed for round two? Drop your take below; I’m curious.

Sources:

Middle East Eye, “Iran receives Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries after Israel ceasefire deal,” July 8, 2025.
Reuters, “World awaits Iranian response after US hits nuclear sites,” June 23, 2025.
AP News, “Trump announced ceasefire is unclear after Israel reports missiles from Iran,” June 23, 2025.
The Washington Post, “Israel-Iran ceasefire appears to hold as Trump heads to NATO summit,” June 24, 2025.
U.S. Department of State, “Imposing Sanctions on China- and Iran-based Entities,” May 15, 2025.

Trump vs. BRICS: Why Tariff Threats Are Fueling the Fire

Every time BRICS meets, Trump gets nervous. This time, they pushed back.

Heat. Heat.

The BRICS summit in Brazil wasn’t just a gathering of emerging economies—it was a signal. And across the ocean, one man in particular was watching closely: Donald Trump.

He didn’t wait long to strike.

“Any country aligning with the anti-American policies of BRICS will face an additional 10% tariff.”
— Donald Trump

No exceptions. Just threats.

But something felt different this time. The bloc didn’t flinch. They didn’t even name him. Instead, BRICS responded with unity—and a clear message: We’re not playing your game anymore.

The BRICS Expansion Is Bigger Than You Think

The original five—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—now have company.

Five new members joined the bloc:

Indonesia
Egypt
Ethiopia
UAE
Iran

Together, the ten countries account for:

Over half the world’s population
More than 40% of global economic output

And they’re doing more than holding hands. At the summit, they condemned tariffs as a coercive tool that threatens global trade. China didn’t mince words:

“BRICS cooperation is open and inclusive—not aimed at anyone. We oppose tariff wars. Arbitrary tariffs serve no one’s interest.”

So why is Trump rattled?

De-Dollarization: The Real Threat

Trump isn’t just angry about alliances. He’s scared of what BRICS represents: the slow erosion of U.S. dollar dominance.

De-dollarization is the move to limit the use of the U.S. dollar in global trade—by shifting to other currencies or bilateral agreements.

Trump once said:

“I hate when countries go off the dollar. I would not allow countries to go off the dollar because when we lose that standard, it’s like losing a revolutionary war.”

He sees BRICS as that revolutionary force.

Trade Is Booming—Just Not With America

Ironically, Western sanctions are fueling the very trend Trump fears.

Intra-BRICS trade jumped 40% from 2021 to 2024, hitting $740 billion in 2024 alone.
Russia, under 20,000+ sanctions, shifted to the Chinese yuan. By mid-2024, 53% of its foreign transactions were in yuan—up from 40% three years ago.
India imported 43% of its oil from Russia in June 2024—more than Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE combined.
Brazil and South Africa are buying Chinese electric cars en masse. In Brazil, BYD took over a former Ford factory. In South Africa, 27+ Chinese models are now on sale.

These aren’t isolated anecdotes. They tell a bigger story:
BRICS countries are building a trade ecosystem that works without American approval—or American currency.

Forget the BRICS Currency. Watch the Bilateral Deals.

No one’s saying the dollar is dead. A BRICS-wide currency? Still a long shot. The bloc has too many internal political rifts to pull that off.

But what is working—quietly and efficiently—is bilateralism.

Deals between just two nations. Currency swaps. Oil-for-rupees. Car factories traded for influence.

That’s where BRICS shines: agility. Flexibility. One-on-one cooperation.

And that’s what scares Washington more than a photo op of ten leaders smiling in Brazil.

“This cooperation has never been, and will never be, directed against third countries,” said a Russian delegate.
“But it is about our interests.”

Trump wanted to intimidate.
Instead, he may have unified them.

Pakistan and China’s New South Asian Club: Is SAARC’s Replacement in the Making?

Imagine a long-running family reunion that never actually happens. That’s been the fate of SAARC – the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation – a once-promising “club” of countries that hasn’t met in years. Why? Mainly because two big members, India and Pakistan, haven’t been on talking terms. Frustrated by the deadlock, Pakistan (with an eager China by its side) is quietly working on a new regional bloc to fill the voidbusinesstoday.in. This fresh alliance would focus on boosting trade and connectivity among South Asian nations – but notably without India as the center player. In a region that’s among the least integrated in the world (only about 5% of its trade is within the neighborhood)thediplomat.com, this development could shake things up. Let’s break down what’s happening in this geopolitical shuffle, in plain language, as if we’re chatting over a cup of chai.

SAARC on Ice: A Club That Stopped Meeting

It helps to know why SAARC became a zombie forum in the first place. Founded in the 1980s with great hopes of regional unity, SAARC brought India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives, and later Afghanistan together under one tent. In theory, they’d cooperate on trade, development, even cultural exchange. In practice? Not so much. SAARC decisions require consensus (everyone agreeing), and the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan meant nothing major got donethediplomat.com. Think of two quarreling teammates dragging down the whole game. By 2016, things hit rock bottom. That year, Pakistan was set to host the big SAARC summit, but a terror attack in Indian Kashmir (which Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militants) derailed everythingthediplomat.com. India backed out, and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan – even Sri Lanka – quickly followed suit in boycotting the meetthediplomat.com. The summit was cancelled and no SAARC leaders’ meeting has happened since 2014thefederal.com. Essentially, SAARC has been in the deep freeze for a decade.

This paralysis has been costly. Many hoped SAARC would foster an EU-like integration in South Asia, but instead it’s “remained hostage” to India-Pakistan animositytribune.com.pk. Trade among neighbors is paltry, travel is restricted, and joint initiatives stalled. India tried some projects (a regional university, a development fund, etc.), but Pakistan blocked a few too – for instance, a plan for cross-border road connectivity in 2014businesstoday.in. In response, India and others started focusing on smaller coalitions that didn’t include Pakistan, like the BBIN group (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal corridor) and BIMSTEC (linking South Asia with Southeast Asia)businesstoday.inthediplomat.com. Those may sound like alphabet soup, but the message was clear: if SAARC couldn’t function as eight countries together, then do it without the quarrelsome parts. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan was left out of these India-led alternativesthediplomat.com. So by 2023, SAARC was effectively defunct – a club with a fancy logo and legacy, but no meetings.

Enter China (and Pakistan): “If You Won’t Join Our Party, We’ll Throw Our Own”

Here’s where the plot thickens. China has long been an observer in SAARC, eyeing South Asia’s markets and strategic position, but it’s never been a full member (India quietly nixed that idea years ago). With SAARC dormant, Beijing seems to have found another way in. Over the past few months, Pakistan and China have been scheming a new regional alliance – call it SAARC 2.0 minus India, or perhaps a South Asian club with Chinese characteristics. Diplomatic whispers say talks are at an advanced stage between Islamabad and Beijing, and both are convinced that a “new organisation is essential” for regional integration and connectivitytribune.com.pk. In other words, if the old gang can’t get along, form a new gang.

In mid-June, a quiet meeting in Kunming, China signaled that this idea is more than just gossip. Officials from China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh met on June 19 in the Chinese city to discuss the contours of a new grouping focused on trade and infrastructure linksbusinesstoday.in. The goal, reportedly, is to bring in other South Asian countries too – invitations would be open to all the former SAARC members like Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives, and yes, even India (at least on paper)businesstoday.intribune.com.pk. Don’t hold your breath on India actually signing up, though. Everyone and their cat knows that New Delhi is highly unlikely to join a China-backed bloc given its fraught relations with both Beijing and Islamabadbusinesstoday.in. (More on India later.) The real target members are the smaller neighbors who have been left in limbo by SAARC’s failure.

China’s motivation here isn’t purely altruistic friendship, of course. This push dovetails with Beijing’s broader strategy in the region. Remember the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? China has spent years building ports, roads, and power plants across South Asia. All South Asian nations except India and Bhutan have signed onto BRI projects in some formthediplomat.com. Beijing has even floated its own mini-forums over the years – from a China-South Asia Cooperation Forum to a Trans-Himalayan Connectivity Network with Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistanthediplomat.com. In May 2025, China hosted Pakistan and Afghanistan’s foreign ministers and agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghan territorythediplomat.com. So, a new multilateral bloc would give China and Pakistan another platform to align their big plans (CPEC, infrastructure financing, trade routes, you name it) outside of the defunct SAARC frameworktimesofindia.indiatimes.com. It’s like they’re building a new stage to perform on since the old stage went dark. And it sends a message: South Asia doesn’t revolve around India anymore. One Pakistani official candidly said, “The idea is to create momentum in the region, not wait indefinitely for SAARC to move.”timesofindia.indiatimes.com In short, we’re seeing a proactive attempt to rewrite the regional playbook, with China’s heft behind it.

Neighbors’ Dilemma: Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka Caught in the Middle

How are the other South Asian countries reacting to this potential new club? Cautiously, for the most part. These nations – Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka (and don’t forget the Maldives) – have the most to gain from any regional integration. They’re the ones who felt the loss when SAARC stalled, and they’ve been urging for cooperation even as the giants foughtthediplomat.com. But jumping aboard a China-led initiative while India sulks on the sidelines is a tricky game. It’s a bit like being invited to a new friend’s party when your old friend (who hates that new friend) is pointedly not going. Awkward.

Take Bangladesh. It actually sent a representative to the Kunming meeting with China and Pakistan, which raised a lot of eyebrows (especially in New Delhi)tribune.com.pk. Immediately after, Dhaka scrambled into damage control mode. Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser, Mr. Touhid Hossain, publicly insisted that “we are not forming any alliance.” The Kunming meet was just “at the official level, not at the political level,” he said, downplaying it as “not anything big and not something structured”timesofindia.indiatimes.com. In plainer terms: Relax, India, we’re not hopping into bed with Beijing and Islamabad. Bangladesh clearly doesn’t want to burn bridges with its huge neighbor India, with whom it shares extensive trade and a long border. Hossain even emphasized that Bangladesh’s relationship with India was just going through a “re-adjustment” phase, and there’s “no lack of goodwill” towards Delhitimesofindia.indiatimes.com. Reading between the lines, Dhaka is hedging – interested in the potential economic upside of a new regional forum, but wary of any perception that it’s betraying India. (It also doesn’t help that Bangladesh is heading for elections and can’t afford to irk any side right now.)

Sri Lanka, for its part, hasn’t made any loud statements yet – unsurprising, perhaps, as it juggles a delicate balance between big partners. Colombo has historically been friendly with China (who bankrolled big projects there) but also relies on India, which stepped up during Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis. Still, given Sri Lanka’s dire need for investment and trade, it is very likely to welcome any new regional initiative that might spur growth. In fact, sources indicate Sri Lanka is expected to be part of the proposed groupingtribune.com.pk. The same goes for the Maldives, which under its new leadership is tilting a bit more towards China’s orbit. These smaller states see opportunity in a forum that could deliver infrastructure or market access – something SAARC promised but never delivered.

And then there’s Nepal. Landlocked between India and China, Nepal has often felt like the rope in a tug-of-war. Kathmandu has been a strong advocate for reviving SAARC – it even hosted the last summit in 2014 and has repeatedly called for dialogue to resumethediplomat.com. But those calls fell on deaf ears as India and Pakistan remained at odds. Nepal’s frustration with the status quo is real; they want regional projects (roads, railways, energy grids) to move forward. If Pakistan and China’s new bloc offers an alternate path to those goals, Nepal will surely consider it. However, Nepal also knows any overt enthusiasm could rankle India, on whom it depends for transit and trade. It’s a classic Nepali tightrope walk. We might see Kathmandu participate in exploratory talks (they share China’s interest in trans-Himalayan connectivity), but carefully – perhaps hoping India might eventually soften and join too. For now, all these neighbors are playing it cool in public. They’ll likely wait to see a concrete proposal and who else signs on before jumping fully in. After all, nobody wants to be first to ditch a decades-old club (SAARC) for a shiny new one – unless it’s clearly worth it.

India: The Elephant Outside the Room

Let’s talk about the obvious absentee in this story – India. How is India reacting to the idea of a China-Pakistan led “South Asian” bloc? Officially, Delhi hasn’t said much yet (perhaps not wanting to dignify the proposal with a response). But you can bet there’s some quiet fuming in the corridors of power. India sees itself as the natural leader in South Asia – it’s by far the largest economy and has deep historical ties across the region. Being sidelined in its own neighborhood is not a comfortable thought for New Delhibusinesstoday.inbusinesstoday.in. In fact, the whole raison d’être of SAARC originally was partly to balance India’s dominance by having everyone in one cooperative framework. If China swoops in now to create a parallel framework that pointedly includes everyone but India, that’s a geopolitical slap in the face.

To be fair, from India’s perspective, SAARC didn’t die by accident – India froze it as a deliberate policy to isolate Pakistan diplomatically for as long as Pakistan “supports cross-border terrorism,” an oft-cited grievance. Indian strategists likely knew this might open the door for China to increase its influence, but they calculated that bilateral and smaller-group ties (like BIMSTEC) could compensate. Now, with Beijing and Islamabad actively courting India’s neighbors into a new coalition, India faces a tough choice: Does it ignore the new bloc, denounce it, or try to quietly undermine it? Thus far, India has doubled down on other alliances – it’s cozying up with the U.S., Japan, Australia (the Quad) and investing in BIMSTEC for regional cooperation sans Pakistanthediplomat.com. Prime Minister Modi even skipped recent meetings of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)tribune.com.pk, signaling India’s discomfort in forums where it feels outnumbered by China’s friends. So likely, India will shrug publicly and say, “Well, good luck forming a club without us.” Privately though, Indian officials worry that their neighbors getting too financially tangled with China (via a new bloc projects) could erode India’s clout over time. It’s a soft power battle: highways and rail lines can translate to influence.

New Delhi also knows one thing: geography still gives India a trump card. All South Asian countries (barring Pakistan and Afghanistan) rely on access through India to reach each other. You can’t drive a truck from Bangladesh to Nepal or Sri Lanka without going through Indian territory or waters. That means any new bloc that excludes India might struggle to physically connect its members – unless China invests in some extremely ambitious (and costly) workarounds, like mountain tunnels or port-to-port shipping networks. In other words, India might be thinking: “Sure, have your meetings and MoUs. But good luck building a real supply chain that circumvents us.” This could be a key limitation of the China-Pakistan plan, and Indian analysts are quick to point it out. Will China pour in enough money to make alternate connectivity a reality? Or will this new bloc remain a talk shop if India doesn’t play along? These are open questions.

A New Bloc: Game-Changer or Pipe Dream?

So, is this Pakistan-China “SAARC 2.0” going to fly or flop? At this stage, it’s still just an idea being floated – there’s no official name or launch date yet (diplomats hint a blueprint might emerge by the end of the year, possibly around the next SCO summit)timesofindia.indiatimes.com. But the very fact it’s being discussed at high levels tells us something about the shifting sands of Asian geopolitics. My take: It’s a bold gambit that shows how frustrated countries have become with the status quo. There’s a real desire for economic cooperation in South Asia – whether it’s to trade more easily or tackle shared problems like energy shortages and climate impacts. If the existing setup isn’t delivering (thanks largely to India-Pakistan mistrust), then why not try something new?

However, there are significant hurdles ahead. For one, convincing South Asian nations to sign onto a Beijing-led club openly is not easy. Many of these countries, like Bangladesh and Nepal, want both Chinese investment and Indian goodwill. They will try to avoid choosing sides for as long as possible. If India perceives this bloc as a hostile anti-India alliance, it could retaliate in subtle ways – maybe by tightening trade, or diplomatically pressuring neighbors not to join. We’ve seen hints of that pressure in Bangladesh’s quick denial of any “alliance”timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Also, any new forum would have to prove it’s more effective than SAARC, not just politically aligned. That means actual projects: highways, railways, power grids, trade deals that cut tariffs – concrete stuff that people can see and benefit from. China’s money and Pakistan’s sponsorship might kick-start some of that, but sustained cooperation needs trust among all members. Can, say, Bangladesh and Pakistan cooperate meaningfully if India isn’t in the room? Possibly, but it’s uncharted territory after decades of everyone being used to India’s presence (for better or worse).

Another big question: What about security and politics? Pakistan says this new grouping is “not a political alliance” – it’s trying to brand it as purely about trade and connectivitybusinesstoday.in. That’s smart marketing, since countries like Sri Lanka or Nepal don’t want a military pact, they want economic gains. But in reality, any bloc involving these players will have political implications. For example, if Afghanistan’s Taliban government is included (Pakistan and China have hinted at involving Afghanistanbusinesstoday.in), that itself is politically sensitive. And if the bloc collectively takes positions on issues (say, a stance on regional terrorism, or on dealing with sanctions, etc.), it could get politicized quickly.

From China’s vantage, a successful new bloc would be a diplomatic win – showcasing that Beijing can convene and lead in India’s backyard, enhancing China’s image as the new champion of developing world unity. For Pakistan, it’s a chance to break out of isolation and rebrand itself as a connector of South and Central Asia rather than a spoiler. For the smaller states, it could mean new highways, ports, and power plants – or alternatively, more debt and dependency if not handled carefully. It’s a high-risk, high-reward bet.

As politically curious citizens, we should watch these maneuvers with an open mind but a healthy dose of skepticism. South Asia has been here before – grand promises of brotherhood that fizzled out. Is this different? It might be, if only because the push is coming from outside the traditional Indo-centric model. A neutral-ish convener like China (neutral in South Asian squabbles, at least) could possibly succeed in getting everyone to the table – something India or Pakistan alone couldn’t do. But without India’s massive market and geographic centrality, any new bloc will have an elephant-sized hole.

So, what do you think? Is the Pakistan-China “new bloc” idea a needed shake-up that will finally get South Asian countries working together on trade and development? Or is it a divisive move that could deepen regional fault lines and sideline India, only to stumble against real-world constraints? The coming months should give us a clearer picture. For now, it’s a fascinating twist in the tale of South Asian cooperation – a tale that’s equal parts hope and drama. One thing’s certain: after years of stagnation, the geopolitical chessboard in South Asia is suddenly alive with moves again. Grab your popcorn (or samosas), because this regional soap opera just got a new plotline.

(This post was written in a conversational style to make complex geopolitics accessible. Informed opinions are my own, backed by the sources linked below.)