When Carl Higbie of Newsmax says that the people of Gaza are responsible for the deaths and destruction because they elected Hamas, he misses the deeper history. The choice made in 2006 was not the open-ended endorsement of Hamas that many in the West assume. It was one election, held nearly two decades ago, in a moment of frustration and despair.
In January 2006, Palestinians went to the polls in legislative elections. Hamas, the Islamist movement that had built its reputation in the first intifada, won a decisive victory. Why did it happen? Many observers agree that it was less a vote for religious rule than a vote against corruption. Fatah, the ruling party of the Palestinian Authority, had been in charge for over a decade. It was seen as weak, compromised, and riddled with self-enrichment.
“People were tired of Fatah’s failures, both in governance and in negotiations,” explained Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, in an interview with NPR. “Hamas represented change. It represented clean hands.”
Hamas also built influence by providing social services. Long before it entered the ballot box, it ran schools, health clinics, and charities. In a society where official institutions often failed, that mattered. A shopkeeper in Gaza City told The New York Times at the time, “At least they take care of the poor. Fatah only takes care of itself.”
The political appeal was reinforced by its image of resistance. For Palestinians who saw the peace process collapse and settlements expand, Hamas’s refusal to compromise felt like dignity. “People were voting against Oslo, against the status quo,” said Nathan Brown, a scholar of Middle Eastern politics at George Washington University.
Yet the 2006 victory was the last time Gazans had a real say. The U.S. and Israel refused to accept the result, sanctions followed, and fighting broke out between Fatah and Hamas. By 2007, Gaza and the West Bank were divided. Hamas controlled Gaza, Fatah remained in the West Bank, and no further elections were held. Today, nearly half the population of Gaza is under eighteen. They never had the chance to vote in the first place.
Critics of Higbie’s framing point out that holding all Gazans responsible is unjust. The International Crisis Group observed, “The lack of elections has locked Palestinians into a leadership they may or may not support, with no peaceful avenue for change.” That is the reality of life under blockade and factional conflict.
There is also the question of coercion. Since 2007, Hamas has consolidated power in Gaza by silencing rivals. Independent voices face pressure, arrest, or worse. Ordinary people cannot openly oppose them. To suggest that 2 million civilians—most of them children—are collectively guilty for decisions made in one frozen election is morally unsound.
The deeper tragedy is that Gaza’s people are trapped between external siege and internal repression. They were given one choice, almost twenty years ago, in a moment when anger outweighed hope. That choice has since been weaponized by critics who argue that Gazans brought this on themselves.
History does not support that view. The election was a protest, not a blank check. The absence of new elections is not the people’s decision. And the suffering of civilians today cannot be excused by a single ballot cast in 2006.
As the late Palestinian analyst Ghassan Khatib once said, “Voting for Hamas was not voting for endless war. It was voting against the corruption that was strangling us.” That distinction still matters.
